Roach v. Angelone
176 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1999) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 12 | Issue 1 Article 20
Fall 9-1-1999
Roach v. Angelone 176 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1999)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Fourth Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School
of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roach v. Angelone 176 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1999), 12 Cap. DEF J. 227 (1999).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol12/iss1/20
Roach v. Angelone
176 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 1999)
L Facts
Steve Edward Roach ("Roach") was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death for the killing of Mary Ann Hughes ("Hughes"). On
December 3, 1993, Hughes was at home when an intruder broke into the
house. The intruder killed Hughes with a single shotgun blast to the chest,
took her car and purse, and fled. Roach was spotted in Hughes's car in
Blackstone, Virginia, and arrested soon thereafter. The police presented
Roach with evidence implicating him as the perpetrator; Roach subse-
quently confessed to the crime.'
Roach, seventeen years old at the time of the murder, was charged with
murder and various other crimes in a juvenile court. The Commonwealth
gave notice to the court that it intended to try Roach as an adult. The
juvenile court subsequently found probable cause that Roach committed the
crimes and transferred Roach's case to the circuit court. After obtaining an
indictment from a grand jury, the Commonwealth tried Roach on counts
of capital murder in the commission of robbery while armed with a deadly
weapon, use of a firearm in the commission of murder, and robbery.2 The
jury found Roach guilty on all three charges. At sentencing, the judge
allowed the jury to consider only the "future dangerousness" aggravating
factor in making its sentencing decision.' Roach was sentenced to death.4
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed Roach's death sentence and
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Roach exhausted all
state collateral remedies and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Western District of Virginia. The district court found no basis for
1. Roach v. Angelone, 176 F.3d 210-13 (4th Cir. 1999). The evidence presented by the
police consisted of a deputy sheriff's sighting of Roach in Hughes's car the day after the
shooting, a videotape of Roach's attempt to use Mrs. Hughes's credit card later that day, the
fleeing of a man matching Roach's description when Mrs. Hughes's car was pulled over for
speeding the second day after the shooting, and Roach's finger and palm prints on the interior
of the automobile. Id.
2. These counts viohted sections 18.2-31(4), 18.2-53(1), and 18.2-58 of the Virginia
Code, respectively. Note that section 18.2-31(4) no longer requires use of a deadly weapon,
requiring only the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commis-
sion of robbery or attempted robbery." VA. CODE ANN. S 18.2-31(4) (Michie 1999).
3. The Commonwealth failed, as a matter of law, to offer evidence that would support
the "vileness" predicate. Roach, 176 F.3d at 214.
4. Id. at 213-14.
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federal habeas relief and dismissed the petition. Roach appealed that dis-
missal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for
consideration of the following assertions of error: (1) the proportionality
review conducted by the Supreme Court of Virginia was constitutionally
defective; (2) the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence of
future dangerousness; (3) the trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding
Roach's possible parole eligibility if he were to receive a life sentence; (4) the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury that its decision regarding punish-
ment was required to be unanimous; and (5) the transfer procedure from
juvenile court to circuit court for trial as an adult denied Roach his constitu-
tionally warranted individualized assessment of maturity and moral respon-
sibility.'
I. Holding
The Fourth Circuit, finding each of his five claims to be without merit,
denied Roach's petition for a certificate of appealability and dismissed his
appeal.6
5. Id. at 214.
6. Id at 226. The court's disposition of two of Roach's claims will not be discussed
further in this article. These claims will be briefly addressed below.
Roach argued for an extension of Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994)
(allowing jurors to be informed of the absence of parole in life sentences in cases where parole
is not an option). Roach argued, as an extension of the Simmons rule, that jurors should be
informed that he would not be eligible for parole until after a mandatory twenty-five years
imprisonment. This theory was rejected by the Fourth Circuit on the ground that all
precedent since Simmons has rejected the argument. Roach, 176 F.3d at 220.
This Simmons-extension argument can only be raised in cases involving crimes commit-
ted before Simmons and has been consistently rejected by the courts. See Keel v. French, 162
F.3d 263 (4th Cir. 1998); Wilson v. Greene, 155 F.3d 396 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 536
(1998); Arnold v. Evatt, 113 F.3d 1352 (4th Cir. 1997). For further discussion of this type of
claim, see Timothy B. Heavner, Case Note, CAP. DEF. DIG., Fall 1994, at 4 (anayzing
Simmons, 512 U.S. 154).
Roach also argued that his transfer from juvenile court to the circuit court for trial as
an adult violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because there was no judicial
finding that Roach had the requisite maturity and moral responsibility to be tried as an adult.
Roach, 176 F.3d at 223. Roach found support for his argument in Stanford v. Kentucky, which
he interpreted as mandating that individualized culpability analysis take place prior to a
decision to transfer a juvenile for trial as an adult in a capital offense. See Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361, 375 (1989) (concluding that the transfer statutes in question required
state courts to make determinations that ensured individualized consideration of the maturity
and moral responsibility of sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders prior to requiring the
minors to stand trial as adults). In answer to this claim, the Fourth Circuit noted that under
the statutes at issue in Stanford, the state courts were required to make culpability determina-
tions prior to transfer. However, the court noted that Stanford did not proscribe Virginia
from providing individual consideration in another manner or at a stage other than transfer;
hence, it found Virginia's capital sentencing scheme to satisfy the constitutionally required
individualized consideration through mechanisms such as the use of the defendant's age at the
time of the offense as a mitigating factor by the sentencing jury. Roach, 176 F.3d at 223-25.
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III. Analysis /Application in Virginia
The court decided each issue under the deferential standard of review
mandated by section 2254(d) of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").7 This statute permits federal courts to
grant a writ of habeas corpus on an issue adjudicated in state courts only if
the proceedings resulted in either (1) a decision contrary to clearly estab-
lished federal law or (2) a decision based upon an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts considering the evidence presented at trial.8
A. Proportionality Review
Roach first claimed that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated because the proportionality review conducted by the Supreme
Court of Virginia was constitutionally inadequate.9 Virginia law requires
the Supreme Court of Virginia to evaluate whether the death sentence was
influenced by passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor and also to
consider whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty
imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
10
The Fourth Circuit, relying on the state court's claim that it compared this
case not only with cases with similar facts resulting in sentences of death,
but also those resulting in life sentences, upheld the affirmance of Roach's
sentence by the Supreme Court of Virginia."1 The court noted that this
claim was essentially an allegation of inadequate application of state law.
Such claims, the court explained, cannot be a basis for federal habeas corpus
relief absent an independent violation of the Federal Constitution.12
Roach argued that the proportionality review conducted by the Su-
preme Court of Virginia violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
7. SeePub. L. No.104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (amending 28 U.S.C. Title 153); 28 U.S.C.A.
S 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
8. Id.
9. Roach, 176 F.3d at 215. The court recognized that Roach failed to raise this issue
in his state habeas corpus proceedings. However, the court also acknowledged that proce-
dural default is generally an affirmative defense that must be asserted by the Commonwealth.
The court does have discretionary power to raise the issue sua sponte, but here decided not
to do so; instead the court considered the claim on its merits. Id. at n.3.
10. VA. CoDEANN. S 17-110. 1(C)(1),(2) (Michie 1999). The Supreme Court of Virginia
relied upon this standard as endorsed by Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (Va.
1992). The court summarily found Roach's sentence proportional due to the common
imposition of death sentences in cases like Roach's. Roach, 176 F.3d at 215 n.5 (citing case
compilations in Yeatts v. Commonwealth, 410 S.E.2d 254, 267-68 (Va. 1991); Chichester v.
Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 638, 652 (Va. 1994); citing Chandler v. Commonwealth, 455
S.E.2d 219 (Va. 1995); Joseph v. Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 862 (Va. 1995)).
11. Roach, 176 F.3d at 217.
12. Id. at 215-16.
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Amendment." To avoid arbitrary and capricious sentencing and to assure
the consistent and fair application of capital punishment, the Eighth
Amendment requires states to narrow the class of death eligible persons.14
Roach argued that the means employed by Virginia to narrow the class of
death eligible persons is ineffective and therefore fails to satisfy the require-
ments of Furman v. Georgia" and the Due Process Clause. 6 Roach argued
that the cursory proportionality review normally applied by the Supreme
Court of Virginia, which had yet to result in the reversal of a death sen-
tence, did not comport with due process because the state court failed to
consider cases with similar facts in which life sentences were imposed."7
Roach concluded that this review resulted in a "rubber stamp" affirmance
of death sentences which did not insure consistency or fairness in applica-
tion of the death penalty.'" The Fourth Circuit, noting that proportionality
review was but one mechanism by which Virginia met the challenge of
Furman, rejected the claim. 9 The court recognized that Virginia also
narrowed the class of individuals eligible for the death penalty by requiring
that a killing fall within the specific confines of the capital murder statute
and that the jury find one of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable
doubt.20
The court's analysis of this issue is significant to Virginia capital prac-
tice for three reasons. First, it is important to note that the Fourth Circuit
was not required to conduct this review. The issue was procedurally de-
faulted by Roach's failure to raise the claim at the state level. However, the
court also noted the burden on the Commonwealth to raise procedural
default as an affirmative defense, which the Commonwealth failed to do.2'
While the court has discretion to raise procedural default sua sponte, it did
not exercise that discretion in this case. Although the better practice is to
voice all issues at the state level, it is at least worth noting that the burden
13. Id. at 215.
14. Id. at 216. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313-14 (1972) (per curiam) (White,
J., concurring) (holding that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment when applied broadly and indiscriminately).
15. 408 U.S. 238, 313-14 (1972) (per curiam) (White, J., concurring).
16. Roach, 176 F.3d at 215-17.
17. Id. at 216.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 218.
20. Id. at 217. These two mechanisms narrow the class of diath eligible persons.
During the guilt phase of a capital trial, the jury must decide if the defendant falls within the
class of capital offenders defined by the capital murder statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31
(Michie 1999). At sentencing, the jury must unanimously find the presence of an additional
aggravating factor in order to sentence a defendant to death. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
264.2 (Michie 1999).
21. Roach, 176 F.3d at 215 n.3.
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is on the Commonwealth to raise procedural default. This may allow an
adjudication of claims on the merits despite the failure to raise them earlier.
Of greater importance is the Fourth Circuit's endorsement of review
of both life and death cases in proportionality review.' Past cases have been
criticized as using the rubber stamp procedure alleged by Roach here, in that
the state court allegedly did not consider similar cases in which the defen-
dant received a life sentence. That was not the case here, as the Supreme
Court of Virginia did consider cases similar to Roach's where a life sentence
was imposed. Thus, Roach evidences a move in the right direction for
proportionality review.
Also of significance is the Supreme Court of Virginia's statutory
authorization to compile cases which are similar to the case under examina-
tion (with respect both to the crime and the defendant) when the court
conducts proportionality review. 3 Although the statutory text gives the
Supreme Court of Virginia discretion as to compilation, it does not grant
the court discretion to make these compilations available to the lower
courts.24 Section 17.1-313(E), in relevant part, states that "[tlhe Supreme
Court [of Virginia] may accumulate the records of all capital felony cases
tried within such period of time as the court may determine .... Such
records as are accumulated shall be made available to the circuit courts."21 It
follows that the court must send these compilations to the circuit courts to
allow them to consider proportionality of the jury-recommended sentence
prior to its imposition. For an example of a motion to compel the availabil-
ity of these compilations to a circuit court, please contact the Virginia
Capital Case Clearinghouse.
B. Future Dangerousness
Roach next argued that the evidence advanced by the Commonwealth
during the sentencing phase was inadequate to support future dangerousness
as an aggravating factor warranting the death penalty.2 6 The Fourth Circuit
employed the standard drawn from Jackson v. Virginia,27 which states that
a court must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements ... beyond a reasonable doubt."2" Hence, the
Commonwealth had to offer evidence which could convince a rational trier
22. Id. at 216.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(E) (Michie 1999).
24. Id.
25. Id. (emphasis supplied).
26. Roach, 176 F.3d at 218.
27. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
28. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
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of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Roach was a future danger to society.
The Fourth Circuit considered the circumstances of Hughes's murder
in finding a sufficient showing by the Commonwealth of Roach's future
dangerousness.29 The Supreme Court of Virginia has endorsed the notion
that Virginia law allows consideration of the circumstances of the crime
itself to show future dangerousness."0  Hence, the courts do not limit evi-
dence on this issue to incidents of prior criminal conduct and other histori-
cal evidence manifesting a propensity for violence. The reliance by the
courts on circumstances of the crime for indicia of future dangerousness is
misplaced. The "vileness" predicate requires that the jury evaluate the
circumstances of the underlying offense." It would seem logical that vile-
ness and future dangerousness, which were designed by the legislature to
provide distinct justifications for death sentence imposition, would necessi-
tate separate evidentiary showings by the Commonwealth prior to their
submission to the jury.3 In cases where future dangerousness is at issue,
defense counsel should argue against the court's reliance on the circum-
stances of the crime alone as sufficient to warrant submission of future
dangerousness to the jury based upon this logical inconsistency. In this case,
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the state court's judgment by emphasizing the
escalating nature of Roach's violent behavior in the months preceding the
killing and the details of the crime underlying the capital conviction.L4
C Unanimity in Sentencing and Effectiveness of Counsel
Roach next asserted that the portion of the jury instructions which read
"any decision you make regarding punishment must be unanimous" was
29. Roach, 176 F.3d at 219.
30. See generally Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 n.4 (Va. 1978).
31. Roach, 176 F.3d at 218-19.
32. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1999).
33. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia relied on Murphy v. Commonwealth, 431 S.E.2d
48, 53 (Va. 1993), for the proposition that the facts of the capital crime itself may be enough
for submission of "future dangerousness" to the jury. Note that Murphy may be distinguished
from this case because the circumstances of Murphy were far more damning to the defendant
than those in Roach's case in that there was more preparation, planning, and brutality in
Murphy. The logical flaw in relying solely upon facts of-the crime itself is perhaps the reason
for the absence of this notion in the model jury instructions for Virginia. See VIRGINIA
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIMINAL Inst. No. 33.122 (Michie 1998) ("[A]fter consider-
ation of his history and background, there is a probability that he would commit criminal
acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society. .. ."). For a
more detailed discussion of the erroneous application of circumstances of the crime to
indicate future dangerousness, see Jason J. Solomon, FutureDangerousness: Issues andAnalysis,
12 CAP. DEF.J. 55 (1999) (Part III this Symposium) (arguing that circumstances of the offense
for which the defendant was charged are irrelevant to determination of the defendant's future
dangerousness).
34. Roach, 176 F.3d at 219.
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improper because it shifted the burden of proof to the defense and blocked
jurors from properly considering mitigating evidence at sentencing." Since
Roach failed to raise this claim on direct appeal and first voiced it at a state
habeas proceeding, the Supreme Court of Virginia found it to be procedur-
ally barred.36 The Fourth Circuit, finding that Roach could not show
sufficient cause or prejudice to excuse the procedural default, affirmed the
procedural default. Roach argued that ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel was the reason for his failure to raise the instruction issue on direct
appeal.
38
The Fourth Circuit looked to the two pronged test articulated in
Strickland v. Washington."9 This test finds the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel violated when (1) the representation was objectively unreasonable
and (2) the unreasonable representation resulted in prejudice to the defen-
dant's case.4" To test the reasonableness of the failure to object to the
unanimity instruction on direct appeal, the Fourth Circuit turned to Mills
v. Maryland4 andMcKoy v. North Carolina.2 Under these cases, instructions
like the one Roach challenged are unconstitutional when used in sentencing
schemes which require the jury to make specific findings as to mitigating
findings. A jury instruction violates the Constitution per the test advanced
by these two cases if there is a "'reasonable probability' that the jury applied
the instruction in such a way as to preclude its consideration of mitigating
evidence."43
The Virginia sentencing scheme does not require juries to make specific
mitigating factor findings; instead, juries are instructed to consider all
mitigating circumstances before making their decision." Given these
instructions, the court found it "unlikely" that the jury was precluded from
considering mitigating evidence regardless of the problematic unanimity
instruction."s Thus, the court found that, under Strickland, it was not
35. Id. at 221.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 222.
38. Id. at 221-22.
39. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
40. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
41. 486 U.S. 367, 386 (1988) (holding that jurors could reasonably have interpreted the
Maryland sentencing instruction that their findings as to mitigating circumstances had to be
unanimous as precluding them from consideration of all mitigating evidence presented at
sentencing).
42. 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990) (holding that the North Carolina unanimity requirement
at sentencing violated the Constitution by precluding consideration of mitigating evidence
presented by the defense).
43. Roach, 176 F.3d at 223 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)).




unreasonable for Roach's counsel to fail to object to the unanimity instruc-
ti0n. s Accordingly, the court held that Roach was unable to establish cause
to overcome the procedural default.47
Practical interpretation of the court's ruling on this issue suggests that
defense counsel must object to this type of instruction at trial and raise the
argument again on direct appeal to ensure meaningful review. The text of
the instruction at issue can certainly be seen as misleading when read on its
own, since it is not true that all capital sentencing decisions must be unani-
mous. If a jury cannot agree to impose the death penalty, the result is not
a new penalty trial, but a life sentence.4"
IV Epilogue
Roach was due to be executed on August 25, 1999. On August 6, 1999,
the Supreme Court of Virginia stayed Roach's execution because both of his
parents had not been notified of a court hearing, in violation of Virginia
law.49 The Supreme Court of Virginia heard argument on this question on
September 15, 1999.' If the court finds that the failure to adequately notify




48. VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.4(E) (Michie 1999). Section 19.2-264.4(E), in relevant
part, states that "[i]n the event the jury cannot agree as to the penalty, the court shall dismiss
the jury, and impose a sentence of imprisonment for life." Id.
49. In 1998, the Supreme Court of Virginia decided Bakerv. Commonwealth, 504 S.E.2d
394 (Va. 1998), affd, 516 S.E.2d 219 (Va. 1999), which interpreted section 16.1-263 of the
Virginia Code to mandate service of summonses to both parents of the juvenile. Meanwhile,
the Virginia legislature has since amended the statute to require the notification by summons
of only one parent. VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-263 (Michie 1999) ("to at least one parent, guard-
ian, or legal custodian or other person standing in loco parentis"). The Supreme Court of
Virginia's interpretation of section 16.1-263 prior to its amendment raised doubts as to the
sufficiency of service in juvenile cases tried under that juvenile statutory scheme.
50. Alan Cooper, Trial Bid Cites Parental Notice 2 Death Row Inmates Seeking New
Cases, RiCHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 16, 1999, at B7. See Ashley Flynn, 12 CAP. DEF.
J. 235 (1999) (analyzing Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d 466 (4th Cir. 1999)).
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